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TORTS: OWNER'S LIABILITY-
LEAVING IGNITION KEYS IN
UNATTENDED AND UNLOCKED
VEHICLE: HERGENRETHER v.
EAST (CAL. 1964)
East, a construction worker, left the job site at the end of the
day and drove himself and a co-worker into the nearby city for food
and lodging. East had the permission of his employer, the co-
defendant, to use the company's two ton truck for this purpose.
Without removing the ignition key, he parked the truck, unattended
and unlocked, in the "skid row" area of the city, intending to leave
it there until the following morning. Sometime during the evening
the truck was stolen and, shortly thereafter, the thief negligently
collided with the vehicle driven by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, a father
and minor son, were seriously injured, and the unknown thief es-
caped.
The perennial problem of the key in the ignition of an un-
attended and unlocked vehicle is not new in the California courts.'
In 1955, the California Supreme Court was first presented with this
situation in the much publicized2 case of Richards v. Stanley.' In
the Richards case, with two justices dissenting, the court held, as a
matter of law, that the defendant, who had left her car unlocked
and unattended on a downtown San Francisco street with the key
in the ignition, owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from injuries
sustained by the negligent driving of a thief.'
The majority opinion in Richards relied upon the common law
rule that the owner of an automobile is under no obligation to keep
it out of the hands of a third person, in the absence of facts putting
the owner on notice that the third person is an incompetent driver.
The court indicated that in the situation of permissive use by a
third person, limited liability, up to $10,000, is imposed by statute
and the negligence of the driver is imputed to the owner.' Following
1 A general survey of the law in other jurisdictions can be found in an extensive
annotation in 51 A.L.R.2d 633 (1957).
2 See, e.g., 6 HASTINGS L.J. 94 (1954); 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 146 (1954); 16
OHIo ST. L.J. 281 (1955); 2 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW 1500-01 (7th ed.
1960).
3 43 Cal.2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 68, 271 P.2d at 28 CAL. VEH. CODE § 402 (1935) as cited in Richards has
since been changed to CAL. VEH. CODE § 17151.
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this reasoning, the court considered the possibility that if a duty
were imposed on a person whose car was stolen, this would subject
the owner to unlimited liability, although a person who intrusted
his car to another would be protected by the $10,000 limit set forth
in the Vehicle Code. The court concludes that this would follow
although the risk created by the owner of the stolen car, by leaving
the key therein, was materially less than that created by the owner
who gave permission to another to use his car.'
One year later, the Supreme Court, in Richardson v. Ham,7 had
occasion to distinguish the Richards case. The defendant had left,
unattended and unlocked, a 26 ton bulldozer which was known to
attract spectators. Three teen-age inebriants were able to start the
bulldozer but could not control it. Plantiffs sustained personal in-
juries and property damage, and the court held, as a matter of law,
that there was a duty to protect plaintiffs from the negligent driving
of the thieves. The Richards case was not a bar to recovery be-
cause the foreseeable intervening conduct, as well as the risks created
by such conduct, were deemed materially different from those facts
as presented in Richards.
In Holder v. Reber8 the plaintiff submitted that the facts pre-
sented were almost identical to those in Richards, but argued that
Richardson had materially extended that decision. The court held
that Richardson was not an extension of Richards as the former
was decided on the basis of the extreme danger involved, plus the
foreseeable intermeddling conduct, which was deemed not present
in Richards.
A later case provided an occasion to review the liability of an
owner who left many cars unattended and unlocked without re-
moving the keys from the ignitions.' The defendant, a used car
dealer, purposely left keys in the ignition locks of cars parked on
his lot for the benefit of prospective customers. This habit allowed
the customers, or others who had knowledge of this practice, to
start and drive the vehicles from the lot. The court, in referring to
Richards and Richardson, held that the factual situation was far
more serious than parking a single car on a city street, and concluded
that this, coupled with the virtual invitation to theft, precluded it
from finding, as a matter of law, that there was no duty owing.",
With this background of pertinent decisions, Hergenrether v.
6 Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 68, 271 P.2d 23, 28 (1954).
7 44 Cal.2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).
8 146 Cal.App.2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956).
9 Murray v. Wright, 166 Cal.App.2d 589, 333 P.2d 111 (1958).
10 Ibid.
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East" was decided. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs but
the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. The motion was based on the absence of a duty
of care owed by the defendants to plaintiffs or to the class to which
they belonged. The District Court of Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict by holding that the special cir-
cumstances of Richardson and Murray were much different than
those in the case under consideration.' 2 In determining that no duty
of care was owed to the plaintiffs, the court relied on the four factors
used by the Supreme Court in Richards and Richardson: (1) mag-
nitude of the risk; (2) the moral blame attached to defendant's con-
duct; (3) workability of a rule of care; (4) the body of statutory
and judicial precedents. 8 The court stressed the trial court's findings
that the defendants were strangers in the city and had no reason
to know that the area was frequented by drunks and thieves. The
court also emphasized the defendants' custom of leaving the keys
in the truck to enable other workmen on the job to move the truck
when necessary. In addition, the court felt that to establish strict
standards of conduct in such cases would create anomalies in rela-
tion to standards of conduct applicable to cases involving imputed
negligence and loaned cars. These factors, taken together, were held
to bar the court from extending liability in the case at bar.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held
that the special circumstances and facts of the case, taken in toto,
required the imposition of a duty owed to plaintiffs, which was
breached by the co-defendant driver and co-defendant owner of the
truck.'4 The unanimous court affirmed the decision in Richards
but held that Richards would not bar the door to recovery in all
cases. The court stated:
Special circumstances which impose a greater potentiality of fore-
seeable risk or more serious injury, or require a lesser burden of
preventative action, may be deemed to impose an unreasonable risk
on, and a legal duty to, third persons. 15
Because the appeal was from a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, the court was required to resolve any factual controversies in
favor of plaintiffs.'" The court found that the character of the
neighborhood, the type of people who frequented it, the intent
to leave the vehicle there all night, and the fact that a two ton truck
11 61 A.C. 482, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964).
12 This case was previously entitled Hergenrether v. Collier, 223 A.C.A. 757,
36 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1964).
13 Id. at 764, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
14 Hergenrether v. East, 61 A.C. 482, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964).
15 Id. at 486, 393 P.2d at 166, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
16 Id. at 485, 393 P.2d at 165, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
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requires special skill to operate and therefore possesses a high poten-
tiality of harm and injury, were sufficiently serious to require the
imposition of a duty on defendants.
The California courts, in the absence of a statute establishing
a duty," are still committed to the rule of Richards which generally
limited liability. However, in Richards, the court suggested two
possible exceptions where liability might be imposed: one, if the
vehicle were left in the hands of an intoxicated person; or, two,
if the vehicle were left in front of a school where the owner might
reasonably expect irresponsible children to tamper with it.' It
would appear that the facts of Hergenrether are analogous to the
latter situation. A review of the cases in point indicate that the
courts have been unduly naive in their attempt to limit liability
in this ever-increasing problem area. For instance, the court has been
willing to establish a duty when the vehicle involved was a 26 ton
bulldozer, 9 but not when it was a passenger car.20 It is true that a
bulldozer has the inherent capability to inflict great property
damage. But, can it be said that a bulldozer, with its slow and cum-
bersome speed and forewarning noise, presents the same danger
to life and limb as a passenger car hurtling down a California high-
way at one hundred miles per hour, in the hands of a "joy rider"
with little or no driving experience?
Hergenrether merely enunciates the rule that the determination
of the duty, which is a question of law for the judge,21 has to be
determined by the particular facts as presented in each case. Such a
standard fails as a yardstick to guide future litigants in actions of
this type. Perhaps, in all cases wherein reasonable men can differ
as to the facts, and as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts,
a duty should be assumed, i.e., a duty to remove the keys from
the ignition so as not to facilitate use of the vehicle by unknown
people who may be incompetent and negligent to the detriment of
innocent plaintiffs. Then, the issue of breach of the duty could go
to the jury. It is submitted that this approach would avoid harsh
and strict results, and would arrive at more equitable conclusions
because each case would then be considered on its merits by the
combined efforts of both judge and jury.
Thomas C. Hastings
17 Hergenrether v. Collier, 223 A.C.A. 482, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964)
stated that Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) suggested a legisla-
tive policy and five legislatures have met without broadening that rule by statute.
18 Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 66, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (1954).
19 Richardson v. Ham, 146 Cal.App.2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956).
20 Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) and Holder v. Reber,
146 Cal.App.2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956).
21 PROSSER, TORTS 207 (3d ed. 1964); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 56 (1930);
FLEMING, TORTS 139 (2d ed. 1961). And see Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,
59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
